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movement away from the goal of self-knowledge by
which philosophers have traditionally judged
themselves takes place in Thoreau's Question. Even
if we consider the situation of the Question unfair or
rhetorically whimsical. it remains a spur.
And
notice that this last dichotomy is a movement in the
Question itself:
the Question is an absolute
condemnation and absolutely whimsical. To engage in
a reflection on ethics and animals, / must know
something
of
their
origins
and
destinies.
Specifically, I must begin with cats.
As a philosopher, I first of all wonder how I am to
place
myself
in
the
situation
of
this
Question ...whimsically or seriously. And being a
philosopher, I of course Question the Question, an act
which opens up a plethora of Questions which expand
in ever-increllsing generality and then contract:
must I become a biologist before I can undertake an
ethical consideration of animals? Can knowledge of
origins and destinies be necessary?
By what
methods, hypotheses, and assumptions am f •to
proceed? Why cats?
In the face of such questions as these. I propose
a clarification of the situation in which Thoreau's

Editors' Note: This paper was presented at
the Central Division Meeting of the Society
for the Study of Ethics and Animals, held

in QUcago, Illinois, April, 1989.

Henry David Thoreau once posed a Question which
now challenges us as philosophers who would take up
the issue of ethics and animals:
"What sort of
philosophers are we, who know absolutely nothing
about the origin and destiny of cats?" This Question
is a spur to us. Even if we object that the Question
requires Qualification, that "absolutely nothing" is
too strong. that philosophers have indeed considered
the Question of the origins of animals, that we know
something ...even if we object that Thoreau died too
young (1862) to fully comprehend Darwin's Origin of
the Species (1859)...the Question provokes us
afresh. Thoreau's question both cites and sites a
failure of philosophy and philosophers: because we
know nothing of the origin and destiny of cats we fail
as philosophers. The Question. further, situates the
failure in one endeavor: knowing cats. A shift. a
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Question places us as philosophers who approach the
issue of ethics and animals. I propose that Thoreau's
Question about philosophy and the origin and destiny
of cats places us within the framework of a central
motif which philosophy adopts when it takes up
Questions about animals. This central motif is that of
production. and it entails the consideration of all the
leitmotifs that are commensurate with it: necessity
of design, the dominance of the end or goal or that
for the sake of which it is, orchestrated behavior,
and most fundamentally the origin of all of these, the
logos. In response to Thoreau's Question, I ask
nWhat sort of philosophy is it that asks Questions
about origins and destinies of animals?"
To achieve a clarification of the philosophical
situation in which this Question is asked. I propose an
examination of two texts: Aristotle's De Partlbus
Animalium and Heidegger's Sein und Zeit.
Specifically, I undertake an exegesis of their
respective discussions of the method for inquiring
about the origins and destinies of animals. I show
that in the matter of animals the method of both
philosophers is structured and guided by the
metaphor of human production. I further argue that
in the thought of both philosophers the metaphor of
productivity dominates their respective notions of
logos. I conclude by arguing that, if we see that
Thoreau's Question is itself a reflection of this
dominant metaphor, it becomes important for a
consideration of ethics and animals to ask.. "What
does the dominance of the metaphor of human
productivity imply for the ethical treatment of
animals? What remains of the ~ that is not
dominated by the metaphor of human productivity?"
Provoked by Thoreau's Question. I now turn to
the methodological consideration in Aristotle's
treatise on The Parts of Animals.
When Aristotle gives consideration to the
Question of origin and destiny of animals, he lurns
the question towards the larger issue of the causes
in the generation of the works of nature. There are
two such causes: the final cause and the motor
cause. Of these, the former is the logos of the
generated being. (My cat. Thomisina. is constantly
on the lookout for a cat toy that is its own motor
cause, so we shall leave the issue of efficient
causality to her.) The logos provides us with the

Between the Species

proximate origin of anything made or produced, be it
artifact or animal:
There is the Cause for the sake of which the
thing is formed, and the Cause to which the
beginning of the motion is due, Therefore
another point for us to decide is which of
these two Causes stands first and which
comes second. Clearly, the first which we
call the "Final" Cause--that for the sake of
which the thing is formed--since that is the
logos of the thing--its rational ground, and
the logos is always the beginning for
products of Nature as well as for those of
Art. (63gb 113-17) I
Aristotle's argument stresses the univocal
character of the final cause in the works of art and
the works of nature. Both are products determined
by their respective logoi, and the site of this
determination is illustrated with the example given
by Aristotle which follows this passage.
To
understand production in nature. Aristotle provides
the analogy of the procedure of the builder and the
physician, (Or is it an example? This determination
remains an issue which my interpretation must
confront.) The builder and the physician start by
forming a definite picture of the end or goal which
they hold to as the reason and justification for each
successive step. As the builder and physician pursue
a goal which determines the best means, so also
works of nature have a good end and final cause
which they hold to in producing the successive stages
that move towards their end. Aristotle states that
the final cause is even more dominant in nature than
in works of art and is the usual way in which most
writers on this SUbject define the origin,
The final cause in works of nature is not always
necessary, and, what necessity there is, is Qualified
by various degrees. Absolute necessity only applies
purely to eternal phenomena, The materials for
production and the order in which the steps are taken
to produce something are also necessary. Further.
each necessary condition demands the pre-existence
or previous production of a particular antecedent.
But, of course, the existence of a particular
antecedent does not make it necessary that the
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e whole; to explein whet it is both in
substance and in form, and to deal after the
same fashion with its several organs; in
fact. to proceed in exactly the same way as
we should do, were we giving a complete
description of a couch. (641a14-18)
a~

particuler product come~ into exi~tence. With the
question of the origin of animals, we have found
layers of sequenced production, none of which needs
to result in a product but all of which are necessary
if the product is to exist.
After a critique of Empedocles, Aristotle points
out both the best and second-best procedures for
investigating these Questions about the origins of
animals:

As everyone familiar with Aristotle knows, the
doctrine of maUer and form, or more specifically
the notion of ensouJed matter, allows him to separate
the task of the natural philosopher in treating
animals from the task of another philosopher
describing the production of artifacts. Even with
this separation, however, Aristotle still preserves
the parallel between animals and artifacts:

The fiUest mode. then, of treatment is to
say. a man has such and such parts, because
the conception of a man includes their
presence, and because they are necessary
conditions of his existence, or, if we cannot
Quite say this, which would be best of all,
then the next thing to it. namely, that it is
either Quite impossible for him to exist
without them, or, at any rate. that it is
beUer for him that they should be there,
and their existence involves the existence
of other antecedents. Thus we should say.
because man is an animal with such and such
characteristics. therefore is the process of
his development necessarily such as it is;
and therefore is it accomplished in such and
such an order, this part being formed first.
that next, and so on in succession; and after
a like fashion should we explain the
evolution of all other works of nature.

Now it is in the latter of these two senses
(the final cause rather than the motor
c8use) that either the whole soul or some
part of it constitutes the nature of an
animal; and inasmuch as it is the presence
of the soul that enables matter to constitute
the animal nature, much more than it is the
presence of matter which so enables the
soul, the inquirer into nature is bound on
every ground to treat of the soul rather
than of the matter. For though the wood of
which they are made constitutes the couch
and the tripod, it only does so because it is
capable of receiving such and such a form.
(641 a28-34)

(640a33- 640b4) 2

The conception of man, or any other animal. ..the
conception which includes the presence of the parts
it is best for any animal to have ...this conception is
the final cause for that animal. We are thus brought
back to the univocal character of the task of
determining the origins of animals and other
artifacts. The procedure for determining the logos
of an artifact is the same as the procedure for
determining the logos of any animal. Aristotle in
fact states:

While animal and artifact differ in the location of the
final cause--the former containing it in itself. the
lalter receiving it from a craflsman--the operation
of the form 8S final cause, 8S ~ remains the
same in the artifact as in the animal. Our model for
understanding the production of animals in nature
remains exactly the same as the procedure for
understanding the production of artifacts. The ~
informs matter according to its own necessity. This
necessity may vary in degree according to the
sequence of the events in the particular production.
Thus, human souls and animal souls alike are their
own logos, their own flnal cause. There is less
latitude in their design than in the design of a couch,
but the operation of the logos remains exactly the

It is plain. then. that the teaching of the old
physiologists is inadequate, and that the
true method is to state what the definitive
characters are that distinguish the animal
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same. Only the parlicular end or goal differs; only
the sile of the ~ shifts: from the mind of lhe
producer of the artifacl lo the soul of the Imim81.
Wilhin the framework of the Arislolelian
metaphysics and the methodology which il demands,
lhe ~ holds a preeminenl posilion in defining the
succession of necessary evenls in any produclion.
According to Arislotle, whal we know of lhe
origin and desllny of cats is the same general nollon
of logos lhal we know in ourselves in following any
procedure from restoring health lo the ill, lo building
a house. lo giving 8 complele descriplion of the
production of a COUCh. The logos defines the origin,
order. means, design, and destiny. It is lheir
principal heading. Whalthen remains of the ~ of
animals lhal is nol defined by the metaphor of human
productivily?
The methodological sleps Arislolle gives in lhis
lexl consolidale a melaphor of productivily lhal can
be read in lwo ways. On the one hand, animals are
like human artifacts in that their origin is
comprehended in lerms of the idea lhal guides the
production: the order of production is underslood in
lerms of the besl means for executing lhe
produclion; and the besl means is delailed in lerms
of the gUiding Idea, the logos. On the olher hand,
animals are like human producers in thal the final
cause. the logos, resides inlernally, wilhin lhe
animals lhemselves. Animals also have a soul, and
lhough the animal's soul is morlal inslead of
immorlal and characlerized by an inlellect lhal is
passive inslead of active, il is ils own logos as much
as a human is ils own final cause.
The metaphor of productivily so dominales
Arislolle's conceplion of the logos in lhis analysis
lhal there is barely any difference belween lhe
human production of an artifacl and the origin and
composition of animals. A cal is like a couch: we
explain the origin and desliny of cals with the same
procedure we use lo explain the origin of furnilure.
Animals are simullaneously producls and like lhe
humans who produce them. and in bolh comparisons
there is no longer a relalionship of simple analogy, Il
is an idenlily, Animals are idenlical lo arlifacls
because they are produced by the gUiding idea or
logos; lhey are identical lo the arlisan in lhal they
contain the guiding idea lhemselves.
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The dual effecls of the melaphor of produclivily
in Arislolle's analysis brings with il a residue of
issues which slill remain to be decided 2300 years
laler, While he leans lowards placing animals wilh
arlifacts, the margin of difference separallng
animals from eilher us or our arlifacts remains
unclear. On the one hand. Arislolle can slale lhal
animals are nol like producers because lhey are
products, and on the other hand he can slate lhey are
nol arlifactual because lhey produce lhemselves. In
delinealing such differences each poinl of comparison
is the alibi for the olher, and the melaphor persisls
in emphasizing the idenlilies among ils several
lerms. This lack of resolution in Arislolle's
lrealmenl comes lo the fore when the elhical
trealmenl of animals demands a decision belween
animals inlerpreled as products or producers.
Wilh this reading of Arislotle, a new Queslion
emerges lhal we mighl plIir wilh Thoreau's queslion.
Do Arislolle's methodological consideralions in De
Parlibus Animalium help us lo fashion a case for lhe
ethical treatmenl of animals?
Or do these
consideralions hinder us by making animals loo much
like ourselves and our producls? In the inlervening
hislory of philosophy and cullure whal remains of
the Arislolelian nolion of the logos which is nol
dominaled by the melaphor of productlvily? Are
production and the Queslion of origin slill linked in
lerms of some form of a guiding idea?
I will now demonstrate lhat the lraces of this
metaphor of produclion can be found 2300 years
laler in the Dasein-analylic of Heidegger's Sein und
M. In the passages where Heidegger lurns lo
consider animals, we find ourselves immedialely in
lhe midsl of a description of production:
Bul the work lo be produced is nol merely
usable for somelhing, The produclion ilself
is a using of somelhing for somelhing. In
the work lhere is also a reference or
assignmenl lo 'malerials': the work is
dependenl on lealher, lhread, needles, and
lhe like, Lealher, moreover, is produced
from hides. These are laken from animals,
which someone else has raised. Animals
also occur within the world wilhoul having
been raised al all; and. in a way, lhese
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Moving
b!lckw!lrd~
through
Heidegger'~
methodological steps, I will show that Heidegger's
analysis goes inside Aristotle's description of
production and generation to attempt an advance
beyond Aristotle by demonstr21ting phenomenologically a tie between the logos and the exhibition of
things in their being.
Heidegger first places his own descriptive
methodology in juxtaposition to what he takes as the
Greeks' hermeneutic standpoint:

entitie5 still produce them5elves even when
they have been raised.
So in the
environment
certain
entities
become
accessible which are always ready-to-hand,
but which, in themselves, do not need to be
produced. (H70, 100):5
In
this
text.
Heidegger's
phenomenological
interpretation approaches animals through the roles
they take on in those projects for the sake of which
we labor. Our production is dependent on entities
other than ourselves: some of which we produce,
some which we do not produce. Heidegger then
points out that animals "in a way" produce
themselves. Animals are products which produce
themselves.
Before pursuing this striking
statement, we should locate such "products" within
Heidegger's analysis.
In Heidegger's methodological terminology these
entities are called "ready-to-hand" (zuhanden) in
the world, and their being as ready-to-hand is the
mode of our production's "discovery" of them:

The Greeks had an appropriate term for
'Things': n¢Wa.'ta.--that is to say, that
which one has to do within one's concernful
dealings (npQ~ls). But ontologically, the
specifically 'pragmatic' character of the
n¢W01:a. is just what the Greeks left in
obscuri t y;
they
thought
of
these
'proximally' as 'mere Things'. (H6B, 96-

97>
To Heidegger, Aristotle is not just any Greek, and so
Aristotle's analysis goes one step beyond this
pragmatic standpoint. It describes the necessity of
the design in all beings: humans, animals, and
artifacts. Aristotle recognized that methodology
must be geared towards displaying this necessity so
that the formal character of the being, the ~ may
be described as the guiding theme. This description
exhibits the character of the logos in a two-fold
way: as both discourse and the internal determination of the being. Heidegger argues that Aristotle's
goal is to blend the two:

Our concernful absorption in whatever
work-world lies closest to us, has a
function of discovering; and it is essential
to this function that, depending upon the
way in which we are absorbed, those
entities within-the-world which are brought
along in the work and with it (that is to say,
in the assignments or references which are
constitutive for it) remain discoverable in
varying degrees of explicitness and with a
varying circumspective penetration. (H71,
101)

A6ycs 8S "discourse" means rather the
same as !PTlAUV : to make manifest what one
is 'talking about' in one's discourse.
Aristotle has explicated this function of
discourse
more
preci5ely
8S
a.noq>oLVECl80:1. The A6yos let something
be seen (!pmVECl80:I), namely what the
discourse is about; and it does so either for
the one who is doing the talking (the
medium) or for persons who are talking
with one another, as the case may be.
(H32, 56)

"The kind of Being which belongs to these entities
(remember we are talking about animals along with
other
beings)
is
readiness-to-hand,"
and
"Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as
they are 'in themselves' are defined ontoloaicocategorially."
(Ibid,) The being of animals is
Our productive
disclosed in human productivity.
activity. defined by that for the sake of which we
produce. shows or exhibits animals as they are in
themselves.
Phenomenologically. how is this possible?
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dimension of the ~ as it comes into contact with
the issue of animals that is independent of the motif
of production?
What I take to be Heidegger' s answer to these
questions might not immediately satisfy us: our
primary access to animals. as well as the rest of
nature. is as equipment that (re)produces itself.
From my reading of Aristotle's description as
operating within the constraints of the metaphor of
production. we might even revert to his formulation
that animals are artifacts that are their own final
and efficient cause. Animals are equipment with a
soul. That is their logos. Heidegger could then be
interpreted as adding the point that the very fact of
the readiness-to-hand as equipment indicates that it
has "this 'Being-in-itself' ...in which it manifests
itself in its own right." (H69, 98) But what keeps
this claim from simply being a reclamation and
legitimation of Aristotle's descriptIon?
Heidegger separates himself from Aristotle's
notion of loaos as final cause in two principal ways.
First, Heidegger writes:

Heidegger's reading of Aristotle is, of course,
informed by his vision of phenomenological
methodology. For Heidegger, logos, in both an
Aristotelian and a phenomenological description. is
letting something be seen. Logos is thus at once a
medium, in the sense that it conveys what is
manifest, and an original act, in the sense that as
apophansis--the "letting be seen" --it takes entities
out of their unhiddenness. showing them in their
truth, aletheia. The Being of entities within the
world is revealed in itself when these entities are
taken up in the "in-order-to" and the "for the sake
of which"
of our concernful involvements.
Heidegger's Oasein-analytic purports to reveal the
ontological structure of Oasein's Being in the world
in terms of the apophantical "as"; it lets Oasein be
seen as it is in itself.
Simultaneously, this
description gives us access to the other entilles with
which Oasein is concerned, and lets these entities be
seen as they are in themselves.
We thus get a description strikingly like
Aristotle's analysis of production: "Entities still
produce themselves even when they have been
raised. So in the environment certain entities
become accessible which are always ready-to-hand,
but which. in themselves. do not need to be
produced." (H70, 100) Aristotle defines both the
production of artifacts
and
animals'
own
reproduction by the final cause: that for the sake of
which a productive series is constituted. Heidegger
defines our concernful absorption in whatever workworld lies closest to us by that for the sake of which
the work is done. This purposeful intention towards
entities purports to serve the function of discovering
entities ready-to-hand as they are in themselves.
Heidegger's analysis of production, combined with
his insights into the character of the ~ claims to
be a development of and a movement beyond
Aristotle and by inference a mode of access to the
being of animals as they are in themselves.
Given Heidegger's analysis. how might he provide
an answer to Thoreau's question? In this analysis
what prevents animals from becoming 'mere things'
that (re)produce themselves which we subsequently
take up as equipment in human production? Would
Heidegger also use the same procedure for describing
a cat as he would for a ,couch? Is there any
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When considered philosophically. the ~6yos
itself is an entity, and according to the
orientation of ancient ontology, it is
something present-at-hand. (HI59,201)
As Heidegger reads him, Aristotle is undertaking a
biological-ontical exploration of life which itself
relles on or is founded upon an existential
interpretation of Oasein as human. Thus, the ways in
which entities reveal themselves as ready-to-hand
is ontologically prior to the disclosures of entities as
present-at-hand.
In the iatter mode. we take
entities as objects of scientific investigation. In the
ontological analysis of the ready-to-hand, our access
to these entities is through our experience of Being,
workIng, and dying in the world. Any biological
report which gives information about "living"
reflects the fact that Oasein lives and experiences
"life" existentially. Logos is thus tied to a human
experience of existence, and is not an entity in its
own right.
Secondly, Heidegger, at least the Heidegger of
Sein und Zeit. criticizes Aristotle for not seeing that
the only mode of access upon which a description of
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being:s clIn be bll:sed i:s DII:sein':s experience of Being.
This experience forms the phenomenological context
and the hermeneutic standpoint of the Daseinanalytic:

being:5 in lerm:s of our own productive IIctivily. we
find ~ to be the medium by which the disclosure
of being lakes place. The ~ Is no longer the
revealed being as It was in Aristotle; it is now the
medium of revelation. For Heldegger, Questions
about ~ remain within the Seinsfrage and within
the issue of identity posed by the grammar of the
copula. They remain Questions which philosophy has
yet to take up In terms of their full significance. Of
these issues Heidegger writes:

Aristotle did not pursue the analytical
question as far as the problem of which
phenomenon within the structure of the
>..6yos is the one that permits and indeed
obliges us to characterize every statement
as synthesis and dieresis, In accordance
with this
structure,
something
is
understood with regard to something: it is
taken together with it, yet in such a way
that this confrontation which understands
will at the same time take apart what has
been taken together, and will do so by
articulating it interpretatively.
If the
phenomenon of the 'as' remains covered uP.
and above all, if its existential source in the
hermeneutical
'as'
Is veiled,
then
Aristotle's phenomenological approach to
the analysis of the >..6yos collapses to a
superficial 'theory of judgment,' in which
jUdgment becomes the binding or separating
of representations or concepts,
(H 159,

How far this problematic has worked its
way Into the Interpretatton of the A6yos,
and how far on the other hand the concept of
'judgment' has (by a remarkable counterthrust) worked its way into the ontological
problematic, is shown by the phenomenon of
the copula. When we consider this 'bond,' it
becomes clear that proximally the
synthesis-structure Is regarded as selfevident, and that it has also retained the
function of serving as a standard for
Interpretation.
But if the formal
characteristics of 'relating' and 'binding'
can contribute nothing phenomenally
towards the structural analysis of the
>..6yos as subject matter. then in the long
run the phenomenon to which we allude by
the term 'copula' has nothing to do with a
bond or binding. The Interpretation of the
'is,' whether it be expressed in its own
right In the language or Indicated in the
verbal ending, leads us therefore into the
context of problems belonging to the
existential analytic, if assertion and the
understanding of Being are existential
possibilities for the Being of Dasein itself.
When we come to work out the Question of
Being (cf. Parl I. Division 3). we shall thus
encounter again this peculiar phenomenon of
Being which we meet within the >..6yos.

202)

Because Aristotle did not analyze the phenomenon of
as a letting something be seen apophantically,
as a letting something be seen as It is manifest in
itself, he failed to see ~ as the medium by which
the disclosure of entities takes place. He instead
identified it as the final cause of the entity, as the
for-the-sake-of-which of the entity, as an entity in
its own right.
As I read Heidegger, the difference between his
phenomenological
description and Aristotle's
analysis is that Heidegger focuses on the locus of the
description in Dasein's experience. and he takes that
locus as the phenomenological point of access to the
phenomenon to be described. Heidegger answers the
Question:
"How do we legitimately obtain the
phenomena to be described?"
For Heidegger what remains to be done is to work
out the question of what it means to attain the being
of an entity. When we comport ourselves towards
~
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In this text Heidegger defers to the later-abandoned
third part of Sein und Zeit on precisely the issue that
concerns us here. To what extent is an animal its
logos. lhe final cause in its production? To what

59

Betw•• n lhe Sp.clll

-Nothing of the Origin .nd Destinv of C.ts: The Rem.inder of the Logos

extent do human acts of production grasp the logos of
animals as either medium or entity? In answer to
these questions, I think that Heidegger's analytic
only improves over Aristotle's in that it
straightforwardly acknowledges that our only access
to the being of animals, to knowledge of their origin
and destiny. is through the medium of our purposes,
our for-the-sake-of-which.
Thus I hold that Heidegger, too, uses the
metaphor of productivity as an alibi for avoiding a
discussion of what remains of the logos outside of
human activities. What Heidegger calls Aristotle's
phenomenological description attains the being of
animals with the same procedure we would use if we
were to give a description of a couch: the procedure
we would use for any artifact, any piece of
equipment.
Heidagger only modifies Aristotle's
approach slightly by pointing out that our mode of
access to entities in the world is through our
intentions and projects. We attain the being of
animals as they are in themselves by disclosing them
as equipment. Logos, whether in Aristotle or in
Heidegger, remains a distinctly human phenomenon;
it remains a metaphor of design imbedded in the
human actiVity of production.
Of course the question arises, "Does a logos for
animals remain which is not defined by our species
or attained for renection through the purposes of our
species?" Thoreau's challenge to us as philosophers
thus remains. Do cats have an origin and destiny
outside the human domain of meaning, purposes,
procedures. and productivity? Every cat owner, of
course, has the suspicion they do.
In Heidegger's text, such questions are
acknowledged. but only as an unfinished remainder of
the Oasein-analytic. Heidegger states that it would
be interesting to raise the question of the Oasein of
animals. but this is a very difficult matter. He even
closes the subject of animals by asking, "It remains
a problem in itself to define ontologically the way in
which the senses can be stimulated or touched in
something that merely has life, and how and where
the Being of animals. for instance. is constituted by
some kind of 'time'."
(Ibid.)
This quote is
reminiscent of the lack of resolution that I found in
Aristotle. Again it is appropriate to ask if there is a
margin of difference that separates animals from
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either us or our prodUcts? Much like the problems
the phenomenon of 't6yos implies for the existential
analytic. these questions about animals are a
supplement to the text that was never written,
literally an untouched remainder of the logos.
The dominance of the vocabulary of production
guided by logos in Aristotle's and Heidegger's
discussions of the being of animals makes Thoreau's
Question all the more a spur to our philosophizing. In
response to Thoreau's question we should ask.
"What kind of philosophy is it that asks questions
about the origin and destiny of cats as a way of
measuring the success of philosophy?" The answer J
have found is that it is a philosophy that searches for
reasons and causes tn being Itself. to the end of
discovering the origin of beings. It is a philosophy
that searches for the logos. This search. in the
texts I have taken up here, takes place within the
framework of the gUiding motif of production.
When we push the issue further and ask what
remains of the ]ogos--whether understood as entity
or medium--of animals which is not dominated by the
motif of production, we find in both Aristotle and
Heidegger that the being of animals is constituted as
a lack. In the passage just quoted from Heidegger.
animals are explicitly described as "something that
merely has life." May we also presume then that
animals have no projects or acts of production for
the sake of which their actions are done? Heidegger
would certainly say. "Not in an existential or
historical sense." Looking at the same issue in
Aristotle we find that while animals have a soul
which allows them to be their own final cause, it is a
soul which lacks an agent intellect. Again we find
that the ~ of animals is defined in terms of lack.
What remains of the logos which is not governed
by the metaphor of production? The answer I find in
the texts of Aristotle and the early Heidegger is that
this remainder is not lacking but is itself conceived
in terms of a lack. This lack is doubly unresolved:
animals lack the requisites to be either human
producers or to be pure products.
We nei ther
produce them nor do they produce. and all the while
we attempt to comprehend them within this
paradigm.
I would like to close with a provisional renection
on the import of these observations for the study of
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ethics and animals. Both the meaning of log05 in the
Aristotelian notion of the source of the productive
design that is common to both human and animal souls
and the Heideggerian description of the medium by
which the design is exhibited place the logic of
arguments that seek ethical clarification about
animals in a double-bind. Most, if not all, inquiries
about ethics and animals remain within the
understanding determined by the metaphor of
production. While we attempt to investigate issues
of the morality and immorality of our behavior
towards animals as means to our productive ends.
we simultaneously strain to escape the gravitational
pull of the metaphor of production and establish an
ethics for animals outside of human activity. This
argument transcends the standpoints of utilitarian
and deontological views because ethics is always the
consideration of the behavior of moral agents, and
moral agents are always productive agents. We can
of course ask, "Are the human ends which subsume
animals as means moral or immoral?" But when we
ask, "Are the actions of animals--whether raised in
captivity or found in nature--subject to standards of
justice?" only our Question remains.
The study of ethics and animals, then, seems to
become a matter of both judging our own actions
towards animals and exempting animals from the
standards for our behavior. When we doubt the
morality of making animals the means to our
productive ends. we have to exempt animals from
the obligations of an autonomous and rational moral
agent as we simultaneously grant them that same
status. This paradox is the manifestation in ethics of
the same unresolved double-bind within which we
found Aristotle and Heidegger when they concluded
that animals are products which produce themselves.
We transfer to animals our own privileged status of
an end-in-itself without granting that animals are
capable of moral action. Here, too, we find a lack:
animals lack the capacity for moral obligations. The
result is that we share half our human status with
them: animals have a moral status but without the
simultaneous acknowledgment that the ends or goals
of animals are subject to moral imperatives.
Thoreau himself might have attempted an
argument that would guide us out of this ethical bind.
Starting from the premise that "All good things are
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wild and free," we could, by an action of
sympathetic imagination, will for animals the
metaphor which conditions our understanding of
ourselves: the capacity to produce and the individual
determination of origin and destiny. Along this line
we could argue that animals are, like us, capable of
producing themselves. Not knowing the origin and
destiny of cats, philosophical speculation can at least
posit the condition for there to be an origin and
destiny independent of human ends. We will not grant
that animals are capable of moral action, but we will
grant them the rights of independent moral agents.
Still. they continue to be t8ken up as melms to our
ends.
The ethical consideration of the treatment of
animals disintegrates as it is pushed towards its
ground. Ethical arguments determine the status of
animals within the framework of a metaphor of
productivity.
The protection of animals in
sanctuaries and preserves illustrates the double-bind
of this logic. We establish "kingdoms" or preserves
or laws intended for some few of them to pursue
their own ends. Doing this for some, however, is not
the same as doing the same for all, and the perceived
interests of a productive society prohibit the
categorical application of the protectionist's
standpoint. Even if we match our own origins to that
of animals in a modification of Darwin's hypothesis
of a planet-wide evolutionary system, this
hypothesis only aggravates Thoreau's Question by
first establishing a common conception of an
evolutionary ground which we have already
determined as our mutual origin and. second, by
deeming the Question of destiny irrelevant in light of
natural selection and historical accident. Thoreau's
question both cites and is situated in an unaddressed
remainder in our philosophical tasks: to Question the
metaphor of the productive agent that guides our
thinking, to say nothing of the origin and destiny of
cats.
NOTES
1. Aristotle, The Parts of Animals, translated by
A.l. Peck, with a foreword by F.H.A. Martin
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937),
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2. Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle. translated
in English under the editorship of J.A. Smith and W.D.
Ross. Vol. V De Partibus Animaljym (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press. 1912). All subsequent references
to Aristotle are from this edition.

The sovereign nations of the bIrds
Pursue their own affaIrs.
What I consider my oomain
They look upon as theIrs,
Their klnpms are as great as mine.
They want no m1s-all1ance.
They reckon not my suzerainty
But sing in wl1d defiance.

3. Martin Heldegger. Being and Time. translated
by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York:
Harper and Row, 1962).
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